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Abstract
We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to
sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity
grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. The
increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor non-discretionary news. News
releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting months generates a
temporary increase in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly
afterwards.
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The timely release of information is central to the efficiency of both financial markets and the
real economy. Information can influence real decisions either directly, or indirectly by affecting
stock prices which agents use as signals (see the survey of Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein 2012). For
example, suppliers, employees, and investors may base their decision of whether to initiate, continue,
or terminate their relationship with a firm on news releases, or stock prices that are affected by
news. Moreover, real decisions may be affected not only by specific information releases, but also
the general informativeness of stock prices.
News can have distributional as well as efficiency effects. In particular, news reduces information
asymmetry between investors, thus protecting uninformed investors from trading losses. Indeed,
Regulation FD aims to “level the playing field” between investors by restricting selective disclosure.
Moreover, these distributional consequences in the secondary market may feed back into efficiency
consequences in the primary market. Uninformed investors, who expect future trading losses due
to information asymmetry, may withdraw from the market (Bhattacharya and Spiegel 1991) or
require a higher cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991), in turn hindering investment.
Importantly, news releases do not occur mechanically whenever corporate events take place, but
are often a discretionary decision of the CEO. This paper investigates whether CEOs strategically
time some news releases for personal gain. Specifically, we hypothesize that a CEO who intends
to sell equity in a given month may delay otherwise past news until that month, and accelerate
otherwise future news into that month. This is because disclosure can temporarily boost the stock
price through three channels. First, disclosure can attract investor attention: Barber and Odean
(2008) find that retail investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, and Da, Engelberg,
and Gao (2011) show that attention-based buying leads to temporary price increases. Second,
disclosure can reduce information asymmetry, encouraging uninformed investors to buy the stock.
Third, if the news is positive, disclosure conveys favorable information to the market.
However, documenting that CEOs disclose more (positive) news in months in which they sell
equity would not imply a causal relationship from equity sales to disclosure, because the decision
to sell equity is endogenous. For example, if a particular month happens to coincide with many
favorable events, the CEO will release positive news (even absent strategic considerations) and take
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advantage of any resulting stock price increase by opportunistically selling equity. Thus, disclosure
causes equity sales rather than expected equity sales causing disclosure. Second, measurement error
could bias the coefficient downwards: strategic news releases result from planned equity sales, for
which actual equity sales are a noisy measure. An actual sale may be unanticipated, due to a
liquidity shock, and so the CEO cannot delay news from a prior month in anticipation (since that
prior month has already passed), or release news in time for the unexpected sale. Third, there
could be omitted variables, such as an industry shock, that are correlated with the CEO’s decisions
both to release news and sell equity.
We identify a CEO’s likelihood of selling equity in a given month by whether there are stock
or options scheduled to vest in that month. These vesting months depend on equity grants made
several years prior1, and thus are unlikely to be affected by the current information environment.
It is unlikely that boards can forecast, to the exact month, when news will be released several years
in the future. We identify vesting months between 2006 and 2011 using the Equilar dataset, and
hand-collect it from proxy statements and SEC Form 4 filings from 1994 to 2005.
We find that CEOs are likely to sell equity shortly after it vests, consistent with diversification
motives. In 57% of months in which stock vests, the CEO sells equity in the same month; in only
6% of cases is the first sale in the following month. These figures are 32% and 7% for months in
which options vest. Thus, scheduled vesting of equity can indeed lead to equity sales and hence
short-term stock price concerns. The link between vesting and sales remains significant after adding
several controls for equity sales.
We use novel data from Capital IQ’s Key Developments database as our source for news releases,
which is available from 2002. This database has three advantages over standard news sources such as
Factiva, LexisNexis, and Dow Jones Newswires. First, it pre-filters the data to eliminate duplicates
and consolidates all the different sources of a particular news item in a single record. Second, it
classifies news into categories, allowing us to better stratify news into discretionary (where the
timing is likely under the CEO’s control, such as conferences, client and product announcements,
and special dividends) and non-discretionary (such as earnings announcements or annual general
1 The average vesting horizon in our sample is three years, with a maximum of eight years.
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meetings (“AGMs”)). Third, some data providers (e.g. Factiva) forbid automated downloads,
restricting their use in academic research. While researchers have frequently used Capital IQ for
transactions, we are one of the first to use its Key Developments database of news items.2
Using vesting months as an instrument for sale months in a two-stage least squares (“2SLS”)
analysis, we find that CEOs release 0.57 more discretionary news items in months in which they
expect to sell equity, 20% of the sample mean. This figure is statistically significant at the 1%
level and after controlling for other determinants of news releases, such as months in which there
is an earnings announcement, AGM or board meeting, analyst coverage, recent stock performance,
unvested and vested equity, and other determinants of equity sales. In contrast, the amount of
non-discretionary news releases is no different between predicted sale months and other months.
We also find a positive relationship when regressing news releases directly on vesting months;
moreover, we find that the CEO releases significantly less news in both the month before and the
month after the vesting month. These results suggest that the CEOs strategically reallocate news
into months in which their equity is scheduled to vest and away from adjacent months. All three
results hold for discretionary news but not non-discretionary news. While our main results use
Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”), they continue to hold using two alternative methods to account
for the skewness of news – a Poisson regression and a Linear Probability (“LPM”) regression
for the probability of releasing any news in a given month. They also hold for both stock and
options individually as well as total equity, and for both firms with and without blackout policies
(identified using an algorithm similar to Roulstone 2003). They are robust to removing out-of-
the-money options (which are unlikely to be exercised upon vesting) and equity with performance-
based vesting provisions (which may not vest if performance thresholds have not been met). They
disappear when considering months in which only out-of-the-money options vest.
A CEO who wishes to boost the short-term stock price will have incentives to release positive
news in particular. We count the number of positive and negative words in Capital IQ’s summary
of the news item using the dictionary from Loughran and McDonald (2011). We calculate the
2 We are aware of only two working papers that use the Key Developments database: Nichols (2009) and Cohn,
Gurun, and Moussawi (2016).
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overall tone of a news release as the difference between the number of positive and negative words,
divided by their sum, and classify a news release as positive, neutral, or negative, depending on the
tercile of the tone score. We find that predicted sale months are significantly positively associated
with the number of positive news releases, but not negative releases.
Next, we study the effect of news releases on stock returns and trading volume to verify whether
they indeed improve the conditions for equity sales. The disclosure of one discretionary news item
in a vesting month generates a significant 16-day abnormal return of 40 basis points (“bps”). The
31-day return is smaller (25 bps), suggesting a temporary attention boost. The median CEO
equity sale, scaled by average daily trading volume, is 4.5%. Since sales are sizable, the CEO may
benefit from not only the higher price that results from disclosure, but also any increased liquidity.
On the first day after a discretionary news release, abnormal trading volume rises by 0.45% of
shares outstanding, compared to the mean of 1%. This value decreases over time, consistent with
an attention story. The median CEO equity sale on a sale day, scaled by shares outstanding, is
0.045%. Thus, the abnormal trading volume of 0.45% can provide adequate camouflage.
The final step is to show that CEOs indeed take advantage of the observed short-term run-
ups in stock price and trading volume. We find that the median interval between a discretionary
disclosure that occurs within 30 days of a vesting date (i.e. is likely prompted by vesting), and the
first equity sale after the disclosure, is 5 days.
Our paper is mainly related to two literatures: corporate disclosures and equity vesting. Start-
ing with the former, several papers examine the relation between disclosure and equity incentives
(Penman 1982; Noe 1999; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Cheng and Lo 2006; and Brockman,
Khurana, and Martin 2008). These studies use standard incentive measures which are likely en-
dogenous. Other papers study disclosure incentives from sources other than the CEO’s contract.
In Balakrishnan et al. (2014), exogenous broker closures or mergers reduce public information and
thus increase firms’ incentives to disclose in response. Ahern and Sosyura (2014) find that bidders in
stock mergers with fixed exchange ratios originate more positive news stories, which improves their
stock price and thus merger terms. While the decision to undertake a stock-financed merger may
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be driven by the expectation of imminent positive news releases3, we study disclosure incentives
that result from equity grants made several years prior.
Another difference with the above papers is that we study the incentives of the CEO in partic-
ular, rather than the firm in general.4 While Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that CEOs negotiate
higher grant-date pay, we show that CEOs can also increase the value of their pay upon vesting.
Applied to the average annual CEO vesting equity of $5.26 million, the 16-day return of 40 bps
translates into a gain of $21,040, in line with the gains to illegal insider trading and option backdat-
ing. These gains come at little cost: changing the timing of news releases is legal5, and involves less
effort than other actions to boost the stock price, such as cutting investment projects. However,
while meaningful for the CEO, these gains are small compared to firm value. Thus, we do not
claim to identify a major agency problem between the CEO and shareholders. The main effect of
delaying news releases may be on stakeholders who made decisions prior to the vesting month with
less information, or on the distribution of wealth between shareholders who traded in prior months.
Note that the welfare effects of strategic timing are asymmetric: delaying information is typically
detrimental to stakeholders, while accelerating information is beneficial.
Other papers study disclosures around option award (rather than vesting) dates. Aboody
and Kasznik (2000) hypothesize that managers who receive scheduled option grants just before
earnings announcements are more likely to have private information than those who receive grants
afterwards. Studying 70 earnings forecasts, they find that the former group is more likely to
issue pessimistic earnings forecasts, which may lower the grant strike price. Daines, McQueen,
and Schonlau (2018) find that before (after) scheduled option grants, management issues negative
(positive) earnings guidance, and 8-K filings of material corporate events exhibit negative (positive)
announcement returns. We study the CEO’s incentives to time news in general, using a sample
of 337,547 news releases that predominantly contains disclosures other than earnings guidance and
8-K filings, and show how the effect differs across discretionary and non-discretionary news. While
3 Ahern and Sosyura (2014) thus undertake a battery of tests to address alternative explanations for their results.
4 Yermack (2014) studies CEO effort rather than monetary incentives. He finds that firms release less news when
the CEO is on vacation and thus disclosures involve more effort.
5 See the Internet Appendix of Ahern and Sosyura (2014) for the legality of strategic news disclosure.
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option grants have been markedly replaced by stock grants in recent years (Edmans, Gabaix, and
Jenter 2017), we show that the CEO’s stock as well as option holdings affect the incentives to
disclose news.6
The second literature studies the relationship between vesting equity and corporate decisions.
Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017) show that vesting equity is associated with declines in in-
vestment growth and a greater likelihood of both issuing positive earnings guidance and narrowly
beating earnings forecasts. Ladika and Sautner (2016) show that the adoption of FAS 123R in-
duced some firms to accelerate option vesting, which in turn led to a fall in investment. Jochem,
Ladika, and Sautner (2018) show that the accelerated vesting following FAS 123R led to volun-
tary CEO turnover rising from 6% to 19% per year. While those papers show that vesting equity
affects real decisions, we show that it can affect the information environment, thus linking a cor-
porate finance variable (the CEO’s contract) to financial markets. Since news releases are easier
to manage than real decisions, disclosure is arguably the most plausible arena in which short-term
concerns will manifest. The only news releases that Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017) analyze
are earnings guidance and earnings announcements, which must be underpinned by real changes
such as investment cuts. We study a much broader set of news items, the majority of which can be
strategically managed without needing to undertake changes in real decisions that may be costly
to the firm and require effort from the CEO.7 Gopalan et al. (2014) study a different measure of
short-term incentives: the duration (average vesting horizon) of the CEO’s equity holdings. This
is less appropriate for our setting as it is endogenous to current equity grants and the decision to
retain previously-vested equity. Gopalan, Huang, and Maharjan (2016) use vesting equity as an
instrument for duration and show that it encourages CEO turnover. Cohn, Gurun, and Moussawi
(2016) find that CEOs with more short-term concerns engage in worse projects, as measured by a
6 Yermack (1997) shows that CEOs can also increase the value of their option grants by influencing their award
dates around pre-scheduled earnings announcements. Options are more likely to be awarded before (after) positive
(negative) earnings surprises. Smukler (2009) documents anecdotal examples of companies releasing negative infor-
mation shortly after what he assumes to be the vesting dates of options. We have data on actual vesting dates and
conduct a systematic study. Fich, Parrino, and Tran (2015) find no evidence of opportunistic timing as a result of
10b5-1 plans, which allow CEOs to pre-announce equity sales.
7 In addition, Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017) study the Equilar data, which starts in 2006, while Ladika and
Sautner (2016) use the R.G. Associates Option Accelerated Vester Database, which covers May 2004 to February
2006. We use the Equilar data from 2006 to 2011, and hand-collect data from 1994 to 2005 to obtain a much longer
sample
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more muted market reaction to client and product announcements, and that these announcements
themselves contain filler words rather than specific positive details. We study a broader set of news
releases and use vesting equity to identify plausibly exogenous shocks to short-term concerns.
In addition to the literature on short-term incentives in particular, our paper contributes to
the literature on CEO compensation in general. While this literature is substantial, it is very
difficult to document causal effects. The survey of Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter (2017) notes
that “compensation arrangements are the endogenous outcome of a complex process involving the
executive, board, compensation consultants, and the managerial labor market. As a result, they
are inevitably correlated with a huge number of observable and unobservable firm, industry, and
executive characteristics. This makes it impossible to interpret any observed correlation between
executive pay and firm outcomes as a causal relationship.” We use a measure of CEO incentives
that is unlikely to be driven by the current contracting environment, allowing us to show that CEO
contracts can affect behavior.
1. Data and Variable Construction
This section describes the variables used in our analysis. Our goal is to study how disclosure
is affected by the CEO’s stock price concerns in a given month. Theoretically, these concerns
will arise if equity is vesting in that month, because the CEO is likely to sell vesting equity for
diversification reasons. We thus seek to identify these vesting months. Information on vesting
schedules is available in SEC Form 4, which must be filed after a stock or option grant. It provides
the number of securities granted and the grant date in a standardized table, and vesting information
in a footnote. For example, Form 4 indicates that John H. Eyler, Jr. of Toys “R” Us was awarded
20,000 restricted shares on April 1, 2004. The footnote reads:
“These shares vest 50% on the second anniversary of the award date and 100% on the third
anniversary of the award date.”
Here, 10,000 shares vest on April 1, 2006, and the remaining 10,000 vest on April 1, 2007.
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For option grants, a second source of vesting information is SEC proxy statements, which
contain the number of securities, strike price, and maturity in a standardized table, and the vesting
schedule in a footnote. For example, the 2001 proxy filing of IBM states that Louis Gerstner
received 650,000 options with a strike price of $109.62. The footnote reads:
“Mr. Gerstner’s grant becomes exercisable in two equal installments, on March 1, 2001, and on
March 1, 2002.”
Here, 325,000 options vest on March 1, 2001, and the remaining 325,000 vest on March 1, 2002.
In a randomized sample of options, we find that the information quality is higher in proxy
statements than Form 4 filings, which are not filed regularly and sometimes missing altogether.
Unfortunately, proxy statements do not provide grant-level vesting information on restricted stock,
which would allow identification of vesting months, but only the number of shares vesting in the
fiscal year as a whole. Therefore, we hand-collect option vesting information from proxy statements
and stock vesting information from Form 4 filings, from 1994 (when SEC filings become available
electronically) to 2005.8 To make the hand-collection manageable, we restrict our pre-2006 sample
to firms that were part of the S&P 500 Index in any year within that period.
For grants starting from 2006-2011, we use the Equilar dataset. Using proxy statements and
Form 4 filings, Equilar provides vesting information for all stock and option grants to Russell 3000
executives, in a standardized format. For each grant, Equilar records the date, size, vesting period,
and whether it exhibits cliff vesting (where the entire grant vests at the end of the vesting period)
or graded vesting. Graded vesting could correspond to straight-line, back-loaded, or front-loaded
vesting; we assume that it refers to straight-line vesting on an annual schedule, as most pre-2006
grants with graded vesting vest on this basis.
We use these vesting schedules to create the variable V estingMonth, an indicator that equals
one if the CEO has any equity vesting in a given month. Our identification strategy is that the
CEO sells equity upon vesting for diversification reasons. For example, the average amount of
vesting equity in a vesting month is $2.2 million. The 10th (25th) percentile stock return in a given
8 While our news source starts in 2002, we collect vesting information from 1994, since equity that vests in 2002
will have been granted prior to 2002.
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month is -14.5% (-6.3%), and so a CEO who experiences a 10th (25th) percentile return will lose
$313,000 ($135,000) by waiting one month to sell vesting equity. These amounts are sizable and
give incentives to sell upon vesting.
Even though many CEOs hold already-vested equity, they may face explicit or implicit con-
straints on selling it; vesting relaxes these constraints and thus increases equity sales. One constraint
may result from ownership guidelines set by the board. These guidelines are typically satisfied only
by vested equity (Core and Larcker 2002), and so vesting allows the CEO to sell equity without
violating the guidelines. Second, the CEO may hold vested equity voluntarily for control reasons.
Since unvested equity does not provide voting rights, vesting allows additional sales without falling
below the CEO’s desired level of voting rights. Similarly, the CEO may hold a threshold level of
vested equity to signal confidence in the firm. Consistent with these points, we show in Section 2
that CEOs sell significantly more equity in vesting months, even after controlling for already-vested
equity. Note that our identification does not require CEOs to sell their entire equity stakes upon
vesting, only that vesting months are a significant determinant of equity sales.
Our main analysis links equity vesting to news releases. We obtain data on news releases
from Capital IQ’s Key Developments database, which starts in 2002. This database consists of
information from over 20,000 public news sources, company press releases, regulatory filings, call
transcripts, investor presentations, stock exchanges, regulatory websites, and company websites.
We exclude news released by the media, and retain only news items generated from within the firm:
those whose sources are company websites, newswires that disseminate corporate press releases (e.g.
Business Wire, PR Newswire, Market Wire, and GlobeNewsWire), SEC filings, and the Capital
IQ transactions database (e.g. M&A announcements, debt issuances, and share buybacks). As
discussed in the introduction, we classify news releases into discretionary and non-discretionary.
Appendix B provides the full classification, as well as the frequency of the different news items, and
Appendix C shows examples of Capital IQ news items for Wal-Mart in the first quarter of 2012.
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The first stage of our 2SLS analysis links vesting equity to equity sales, to show that it indeed
induces short-term stock price concerns.9 We obtain data from the Thomson Financial Insider Trad-
ing database, which is collected from SEC Form 4. SaleMonth is an indicator that equals one if the
CEO sells any equity in a given month. The second stage relates NewsEvents, the number of news
events, to SaleMonth, instrumented using V estingMonth. We control for several variables that
likely affect the CEO’s incentive to release news in a given month. EAY early and EAQuarterly
are indicators for whether that month featured a yearly or quarterly earnings announcement. AGM
and Board are indicators for whether there is an AGM or board meeting that month, which Dim-
itrov and Jain (2011) show are positively associated with news releases. EarningsSurprise is that
month’s earnings surprise, taken from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (“I/B/E/S”); it is
zero if there is no earnings announcement that month. Analyst is the number of analysts following
the stock (from I/B/E/S). Balakrishnan et al. (2014) show that firms release news to compensate
for a loss in analyst coverage. V estedSensitivity and UnvestedSensitivity are the sensitivity of the
CEO’s already-vested and unvested equity to a 100% change in the stock price.10 We do not make
clear predictions for the coefficients on these variables because both are endogenous. For example,
the decision to hold onto vested equity, or the CEO’s willingness to accept new unvested equity
as compensation, could be driven by the anticipation of future positive news releases. We also
include control variables that may affect the CEO’s decision to sell equity in the first stage. We use
the firm-level controls in Fos and Jiang (2016)’s study of option exercise behaviour: the 12-month
past stock return (PastReturn), idiosyncratic volatility (IdioV ol), Tobin’s Q (Q), sales growth
(SalesGrowth), the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure (Liquidity), dividend yield (DivY ield), and
market capitalization (MarketCap). The calculation of all controls is described in Appendix A.
After filtering for the availability of these controls, we have 337,547 news releases.
9 For brevity, we will use the term “equity sales” to refer to standard stock sales, sales of shares obtained upon
option exercise, or the CEO canceling some shares to pay for taxes or the strike price upon option exercise.
10 For V estedSensitivity, we first calculate the delta of the vested securities. We calculate the Black-Scholes value
of an option grant using the strike price and maturity date from either the proxy statement or Equilar, the average
monthly stock return volatility over the past 12 months, the annual dividend yield from CRSP, and the one-month
Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate. We sum across the deltas of all option grants and add the number of shares
(since the delta of a share is 1) to calculate the aggregate delta of all vested securities: their dollar sensitivity to a
$1 increase in the stock price. We multiply it by the stock price at prior month-end to calculate V estedSensitivity,
the dollar sensitivity to a 100% change in the stock price. UnvestedSensitivity is calculated analogously.
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Table 1 presents summary statistics for our main variables. Panel A shows that vesting periods
average 3.2 years for stock and 3.6 years for options, with a maximum of 7 and 8 years, respectively.
Thus, vesting equity is determined by equity grants awarded to the CEO several years prior, and
can plausibly be considered exogenous. Excluding no-news months, a typical firm has an average
of 4.1 news releases, of which 3.8 are discretionary. Including no-news months, the averages are
3.0 and 2.8. Figure 1 plots a histogram of the number of discretionary and non-discretionary news
items per firm-month. Panel B of Table 1 gives the frequency of discretionary and non-discretionary
news across vesting and non-vesting months. Panel C provides summary statistics on equity vesting
and equity sales by CEOs. On average, CEOs sell $6.75 million of equity per year and there are
2.4 vesting months per year. Appendix D shows the distribution of events across months. The first
quarter contains approximately 40% of vesting months and 80% of yearly earnings announcements.
It will therefore be important to control for month fixed effects in our analyses.
2. News Releases in Predicted Sale Months and Vesting Months
2.1 Equity vesting months and CEO sales
This section studies whether CEOs indeed sell equity soon after it vests, to verify the validity of
our instrument. In Table 2, we compute the average distance between the month in which a CEO’s
stock or options vest and the month in which we first observe equity sales.11 In 57% of cases, the
CEO sells equity in the month in which stock vests. The frequency of first equity sales in any
subsequent month is less than 6%. The pattern is similar for the vesting of options, but with lower
magnitudes (32%) for the vesting month, because some options may be out of the money.
11 We obtain the Insider Trading data up to 2014, to give CEOs 36 months to sell their equity following the end
of our Equilar data in 2011. The following example illustrates how we treat the case of multiple vesting months
before a sale. Assume that equity vests in March and June, and that the first observed sale is in July. We consider
this observation as both a first sale 4 months after the March vesting month, and a first sale 1 month after the June
vesting month.
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In Table OA1 of the Online Appendix, we show similar results when conducting a regression
with control variables. Specifically, we run:
SaleMonthi,t = α+ β1 ∗ V estingMonthi,t + β2 ∗MonthBeforei,t + (1)
+ β3 ∗MonthAfteri,t + γ ∗ Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t,
where MonthBefore and MonthAfter are indicators for the months before and after the vesting
month, and Controls are the controls described in Section 1. The results are consistent with Table
2: CEOs are 25% more likely to sell shares in a month in which stock vests than in a month in
which no stock vests; this figure is 12% for options. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
2.2 Quantity of news releases
Table 3 reports the core result of this paper, that news releases are significantly higher in months in
which the CEO is expected to sell equity. Since actual equity sales are endogenous, we use vesting
months as an instrument. The instrument is relevant since vesting months are strongly correlated
with sale months, as shown in Table 2. It also likely satisfies the exclusion restriction since vesting
months are determined by equity grants awarded several years prior.
Panel A runs the following 2SLS specification:
SaleMonthi,t = α+ β1 ∗ V estingMonthi,t + γ ∗ Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t (2)
NewsEventsi,t = α+ β1 ∗ ̂SaleMonthi,t + γ ∗ Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t (3)
In the second stage, our main explanatory variable is the predicted value ̂SaleMonth from the
first stage. In all regressions (except for the event study of Table 6 and the two-stage Poisson
regression), standard errors are clustered at the firm level and adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
We use year, month, and firm fixed effects to control for unobservable firm-level or time-specific
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determinants of equity sales. (The results are unchanged when using CEO instead of firm fixed
effects.)
Column (1) reports the first stage and, consistent with Table 2, further verifies the relevance
criterion. The CEO is 11% more likely to sell equity in a given month if equity is also vesting
in that month. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for instrument relevance is 203. Column (2)
shows that, in the second stage, the CEO releases 0.57 more discretionary news items in months in
which equity sales are expected. Compared to the average number of discretionary news releases
of 2.79 per month, this corresponds to a 20% increase. Column (3) shows no relationship with
non-discretionary news, consistent with the CEO having less latitude to reallocate such news. This
insignificance also suggests that our control variables absorb sources for a relationship between
vesting months and news releases that are not related to incentives.
To investigate the bias caused by the potential endogeneity of SaleMonth, columns (4) and
(5) present uninstrumented OLS regressions on actual sale months. Recall from the Introduction
that two sources of endogeneity act in different directions. The first is reverse causality: (non-
strategic) positive news releases induce the CEO to sell equity, which inflates the coefficient. The
second is measurement error: unexpected equity sales (e.g. due to a liquidity shock) do not allow
a CEO to delay news releases from the month prior, which deflates the coefficient. We find that
the coefficient on SaleMonth, while significant at the 1% level in column (4), is smaller than in
the instrumented specification of column (2), suggesting that the second source of endogeneity is
larger. The Introduction also suggested a third source of endogeneity, omitted variables, which is ex
ante unsigned. The comparison suggests that any omitted variables are likely to be correlated with
news releases and equity sales in opposite directions. Column (5) shows that the results remain
insignificant for non-discretionary news.
As shown in Figure 1, the distribution of news releases is positively skewed. Panel B uses
a Poisson specification, which accounts for both skewness and discreteness. We conduct a two-
stage Poisson regression using the Control Function approach. In the first stage, we run an OLS
regression of SaleMonth on V estingMonth and controls, and take the residual. The second stage
runs a Poisson regression of news releases similar to equation (3), except that SaleMonth replaces
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̂SaleMonth, the first-stage residual is included as an additional control, and the standard errors
are bootstrapped. The results are very similar to Panel A. In sale months, discretionary news
releases are 17% higher than in non-sale months, significant at the 1% level. There is no difference
for non-discretionary news, and the relationship is markedly weaker when running the second-stage
regression excluding the first-stage residual, i.e. a single-stage Poisson. (In a further robustness
check in Section 4.1, we will alternatively address skewness with an LPM regression.)
While Table 3 relates news releases to predicted sale months, Table 4 relates them to vesting
months directly. This reduced-form regression also allows us to study news releases in the months
adjacent to the vesting month. We run the following OLS regression:
NewsEventsi,t = α+ β1 ∗ V estingMonthi,t + β2 ∗MonthBeforei,t + (4)
+ β3 ∗MonthAfteri,t + γ ∗ Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t
In the 2SLS regression all controls for equity sales in the first stage were automatically included
as controls for news releases in the second stage. In the OLS analysis of Table 4, we have freedom
over which control variables to choose. We retain the same controls as in the 2SLS, both for
consistency and also because there are economic reasons for why the Fos and Jiang (2016) control
variables for option exercises may also affect news releases. If PastReturn and Q are low, the firm
may be undervalued, increasing the CEO’s incentive to release good news. Firms with low Analyst
and MarketCap tend to be less covered, and so may release more news to compensate; relatedly,
illiquid stocks (low Liquidity) tend to be thinly traded and capture less attention, increasing the
role of news. IdioV ol and SalesGrowth may arise from significant activity taking place within a
firm, leading to news releases. Finally, firms with non-zero DivY ield will release dividend-related
news. (The results are unchanged when omitting the Fos and Jiang 2016 control variables.)
Column (1) of Panel A shows that discretionary news releases are not only higher in vesting
months (similar to Table 3) but also lower in both the month before and month after. All coefficients
are significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that the CEO may be strategically delaying
news until the vesting month and accelerating it into the vesting month. Column (3) finds the
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same results for the Poisson specification. Column (2) finds no relationship with either the vesting
month or adjacent months for discretionary news.
Panel B studies the link between news releases and the amount of vesting equity. We replace
V estingMonth with V estingSensitivity, the sensitivity of the vesting securities to a 100% change
in the stock price, calculated analogously to V estedSensitivity and UnvestedSensitivity, and drop
MonthBefore and MonthAfter. The sensitivity of vesting equity is significantly positively related
to discretionary news releases, but unrelated to non-discretionary news releases, in both the OLS
and Poisson specifications. The difference in the coefficient of interest between the discretionary
and non-discretionary regressions is significant at the 1% level in both OLS specifications; under
Poisson, it is significant at the 10% level when V estingMonth is the main explanatory variable,
and at the 5% level using V estingSensitivity.12
2.3 Positivity of news releases
While Sections 2.1 and 2.2 study news releases in general, this section studies their tone. Our
hypothesis is that, in vesting months, the CEO should release not only a greater number of news
items, but also more positive news. In Table 5, we perform an analysis similar to that in Tables
3 and 4, except that the dependent variable is either the number of positive, neutral, or negative
discretionary news items in that month, using the classification described in the introduction. Out
of our 337,547 news items, 219,617 have tone data. This difference arises because some news
items do not have words – for example, an earnings release date announcement may only contain
the announced date. A news item with only neutral words (so the total number of positive and
negative news releases, in the denominator of the tone measure, is zero) is classified as neutral.
Panel A is the analog of Table 3. Columns (1)-(3) report the second-stage results of a 2SLS
analysis (for brevity, we do not report the first stage, which is similar to Table 3). The number of
12 We use V estingMonth as our key explanatory variable for two reasons. First, V estingMonth results are easier
to interpret: we can compare the amount of news disclosed in vesting versus non-vesting months, and versus the
previous and following months. Second, V estingSensitivity is relevant for CEO actions that likely have long-run
costs, such as cutting investment as studied by Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017). Instead, the main effects of
strategic news timing are likely to be on other stakeholders or the distribution of wealth between trading shareholders.
In addition, news timing arguably involves less effort than changing investment plans, and so it may be that vesting
equity of any amount induces the CEO to increase disclosures.
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positive news releases are significantly higher (at the 1% level) in predicted sale months, but there
is no change in the number of neutral or negative news releases. Columns (4)-(6) show the same
results using a two-stage Poisson specification.
Panel B conducts reduced-form analyses analogous to Table 4 and finds that, under both OLS
and Poisson, positive news releases increase in vesting months, significant at the 1% level, but
significantly decline in adjacent months. Negative news releases are insignificant in both specifica-
tions, and neutral news is insignificant under OLS and negatively significant at the 10% level under
Poisson. The difference in the coefficient on V estingMonth between positive and negative news is
significant at the 1% level in both specifications. There are fewer positive news releases in both the
months before and after the vesting month under both OLS and Poisson.
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that vesting equity induces the CEO to release positive
news, but not neutral or negative news. This result is consistent with vesting equity providing the
CEO with incentives to boost the short-term stock price.
3. Returns and Volume in Equity Vesting Months
We have shown that CEOs release more news in vesting months, and that such news is more likely
to be positive. Our hypothesis is that they do so to increase the stock price and trading volume.
In Table 6, we study whether news releases indeed have these effects. In Panel A, we calculate the
average 2-day ([0,1]), 16-day ([0,15]), and 31-day ([0,30]) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and
daily abnormal trading volume around the release of discretionary news. We use these different
windows to test whether any price and volume increases are temporary, as predicted by an attention
story. The CAR is calculated over the CRSP value-weighted index, using a beta estimated over [-
300,-46]. The daily abnormal trading volume is the daily trading volume minus the average trading
volume over [-70,-31], divided by the number of shares outstanding, and excludes the CEO’s own
trades (including them has very little effect on the results.)
The univariate analysis of Panel A shows that a discretionary news release in a vesting month is
associated with a 2-day (16-day) CAR of 31 bps (40 bps), both significant at the 1% level. The 31-
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day CAR is lower at 25 bps, consistent with an attention story. The positive stock price reaction to
discretionary news releases in vesting months is consistent with these releases being more positive,
as documented in Table 5. However, it could also arise from the news attracting attention to the
stock – thus, Table 5 analyzes the content of the news releases, rather than the stock price reaction,
to measure their positivity.
As a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the dollar gain to the CEO, Table 1, Panel C reports
that the average annual value of CEO equity vesting is $5.26 million. Therefore, a 40 bp CAR
implies an average gain of $21,040.13 While this gain appears modest, it is in line with gains
reported in cases of illegal insider trading. For example, Meulbroek (1992) reports a median gain
per security of $17,628. This figure is for 1980-9 (i.e. with a midpoint of 1985) whereas our numbers
are for 2002-11 (i.e. with a midpoint of 2007). Adjusting for inflation, the Meulbroek (1992) number
becomes $33,968 in 2007 terms. Yermack (1997) reports the median gain over 1992-4 from timing
of option grants (later found by Lie 2005 to be illegal) was $11,100 ($15,600) after 20 (50) trading
days. Adjusted for inflation, these numbers become $15,927 and $22,384. Thus, the returns to news
timing are of similar magnitude to those from illegal insider trading and option backdating, even
though news timing is not illegal and, as our results in Section 2.2 imply, do not appear to have
reputational consequences for the CEO. Thus, the risk-adjusted benefit to the CEO is significantly
higher. Turning to the gains from other actions, Adams and Ferreira (2008) similarly find that small
amounts can have large effects: board meeting fees (which average $1,000) significantly increase
director attendance.
The estimated gains to the CEO are economically meaningful but also plausible. In particular,
while significant for the CEO (especially because they come at little cost), they are not substantial
compared to firm value, and so it is unlikely that boards would intervene to prevent such strategic
timing. The main effect is on stakeholders who base their decisions on the stock price, or on the
distribution of wealth between trading shareholders.
13 This figure represents the gain if the CEO discloses one additional news item in each vesting month, and sells
the vesting equity 16 days after the disclosure. Instead of using the CEO’s average annual vesting equity, we could
use the average annual equity sales of $6.75 million. This would imply higher gains for the CEO.
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Panel A also reports the price reactions to disclosures in non-vesting months. The 2-day, 16-day
and 31-day CARs for discretionary news in non-vesting months are 16, 29, and 19 bps, respectively.
That these CARs are all lower than in vesting months suggests that the CEO may be releasing
particularly attention-grabbing or positive news in vesting months. Panel B reports similar results
after controlling for the day and month of earnings announcements, AGMs, and board meetings.
The 2-day reaction to discretionary news is 16 bps higher for vesting months than non-vesting
months, significant at the 1% level.
In addition to increasing the stock price, news releases can also benefit the CEO by increasing
the trading volume, thus reducing the price impact of the equity sales. Columns (4)-(6) of Panel A
report that, in a vesting month, the release of discretionary news generates average daily abnormal
trading volume of 0.45% of shares outstanding over 2 days, significant at the 1% level. The figure
falls to 0.05% over 16 days and 0.01% over 31 days, consistent with an attention story. The average
daily trading volume is 1% of shares outstanding and the CEO’s average equity sale (on a sale day)
is 0.045%. Thus, the 2-day abnormal trading volume is significantly higher than the average CEO
equity sale, and so can provide adequate camouflage. Note that this high ratio is not because CEO
sale volumes are small: the median CEO equity sale is 4.5% of the average daily trading volume.
Panel B adds controls for other events and finds a similar pattern.
The greater price reaction to discretionary news releases in vesting versus non-vesting months
suggests that the market does not fully take into account the CEO’s greater incentives to release
news in vesting months. Thus, news releases do affect stock prices, and so potentially have redistri-
butional consequences and affect real decisions. One potential explanation for why the market does
not take into account the CEO’s short-term concerns is that data on equity vesting is not salient
and must be hand-collected from footnotes in Form 4 filings. Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014)
find long-run abnormal returns to portfolios formed on the CEO’s total shareholdings. That even
total shareholdings are not fully incorporated by the market is consistent with the market not tak-
ing into account the CEO’s equity vesting schedule, which is much less salient. In addition, while a
rational market may discount the information content of positive news releases issued by a manager
with vesting equity, the positive returns to disclosures may stem from them attracting attention
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(rather than their information content), which is less likely to be discounted. Indeed, the greater
volume reaction to discretionary news in vesting versus non-vesting months is also consistent with
CEOs releasing particularly attention-seeking news in vesting months. In contrast, Cohn, Gurun,
and Moussawi (2016) find that the market reacts less positively to client and product announce-
ments made by CEOs with more short-term concerns, and that the announcements themselves lack
detail on specific positive attributes. Thus, the more muted market reaction is likely a result of
the announcement itself being less positive, rather than the market taking into account the CEO’s
short-term concerns.
Since the stock price and volume increases are temporary, we study whether CEOs indeed take
advantage of these short-term effects by selling their equity shortly after news releases in vesting
months. Figure 2 illustrates the number of trading days between a news release and the first
subsequent CEO equity sale. We focus on news releases that are within 30 days of the most recent
vesting date, as these releases are most likely to be prompted by vesting (and thus the intention to
sell) rather than other reasons. Half of the first equity sales occur within 5 days after the release
of discretionary news in vesting months, compared to 7 days for non-discretionary news.
4. Robustness Tests and Additional Analyses
4.1 Robustness tests
In Table 7, Panel A, we examine the robustness of our main result of Table 3, column (2) (the
relationship between the number of news releases and predicted sale months) to alternative speci-
fications. To save space, we report only the coefficient on ̂SaleMonth.
In row (1), we conduct a two-stage LPM regression, where the dependent variable in the second
stage is an indicator for whether news was released in a given month. It thus captures the extensive
margin only, being unaffected by the actual number of news items in the month, and so is unaffected
by skewness. The results are similar to Table 3. In terms of economic significance, the CEO is 8.6%
more likely to release some news in a predicted sale month. This magnitude is lower than the 20%
under the 2SLS specification as it only captures the extensive margin. Moreover, in untabulated
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results, we have re-run all other analyses using LPM and find that they all remain robust (i.e.
̂SaleMonth is positive and significant only for discretionary news and not non-discretionary news,
and only for positive news and not neutral nor negative news).
In row (2), we restrict our sample to firms that were part of the S&P 500 at some point between
1994 and 2011. This restriction excludes small firms in the Russell 3000 covered by Equilar, to
study whether our results are driven exclusively by small firms. In row (3), we restrict our sample
to firms covered in the Equilar database (i.e. consider only observations within 2006-2011), which
reduces the effect of any inaccuracy in our hand-collected data from 1994-2005.14 In both rows,
the coefficient on ̂SaleMonth remains positive and significant at the 1% level.
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Daines, McQueen, and Schonlau (2018) argue that CEOs
release more negative news before the award date of an option grant, and more positive news after
the award date. In row (4), we control for GrantMonth, an indicator for the award date of (actual)
stock and option grants. The coefficient is significant at the 6% level (p-value of 1.92).
Bettis et al. (2010) find that performance-based vesting provisions have become increasingly
common in equity grants. Such grants will not vest on their scheduled vesting date if certain per-
formance thresholds have not been met, and so may provide weaker incentives to release news. Row
(5) excludes from our sample all grants with performance-based vesting provisions; this information
is available in Equilar and the footnotes of Form 4 filings and proxy statements. All coefficients
remain significant at the 1% level.
The award of restricted stock to CEOs has become more common than options recently (Fryd-
man and Jenter 2010), in part due to the option backdating scandal. In rows (6) and (7), we limit
our sample to stock and options, respectively. Specifically, in row (7), the first stage now defines
V estingMonth as a month in which stock is vesting – i.e. we remove any months in which only
options vest; row (8) studies option vesting months and removes any months in which only stock
vests. The coefficient on ̂SaleMonth remains significant at the 1% level for options; for stock, the
coefficient is significant at the 6% level (p-value of 1.92).
14 Note that some hand-collected data will still be used in this sub-sample, because grants vesting from 2006
onwards may still be awarded prior to 2006.
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The next analyses investigate whether our results are affected by blackout policies, which restrict
CEOs from selling equity except for in a short window (e.g. after an earnings announcement or
other news event). Such policies may affect the incentives to strategically time news releases in two
conflicting ways. First, the CEO may not be free to sell equity upon vesting if the vesting date
falls within a blackout period, and thus has less incentive to release news upon vesting. Second,
some blackout policies allow the CEO to trade after a major news event, since the news release
reduces information asymmetry.15 Thus, the CEO has an additional incentive to release news over
and above the stock price and volume boost – it creates a window during which the CEO can sell.
Either way, we wish to ensure that our results are not driven exclusively by firms with (or without)
blackout policies.
We identify firms that are likely to have blackout periods using a methodology similar to Roul-
stone (2003). We gather the open-market purchases, sales, and option exercises made by officers
and directors of the firms in our sample from the Thomson Reuters Insider Trading filings. We
calculate, for each firm-year, the percentage of trades that are made 20 days or fewer after an earn-
ings announcement. If this percentage is 75% or more, we consider that firm to have a blackout
policy. We drop observations for which trading data is missing from Thomson Reuters.16 Rows
(8) and (9) show that the coefficients on the vesting and adjacent months are significant in both
subsamples and in both specifications. The significance of ̂SaleMonth is 5% for blackout firms and
1% for non-blackout firms. Thus, our results are not driven by firms with (or without) blackout
policies. Similarly, the median interval between a discretionary disclosure in a vesting month and
first sale by the CEO is 6 days when excluding firms without blackout policies, close to what Figure
2 shows for the full sample.
While V estingSensitivity takes the moneyness of options into account, the next analyses do
so directly. We hypothesize that options that are sufficiently out-of-the-money are unlikely to be
15 For example, the blackout policy of Monster Worldwide prevents the CEO from trading when the board possesses
“information which, if made public, could have a material impact on the price of the shares of the Company’s Common
Stock”, but the blackout period ends ten days after the information is made public.
16 The only difference with Roulstone (2003) is that he identifies blackout firms, since he has a short time period;
we identify blackout firm-years, to allow for the fact that blackout policies have become more popular over time.
Thus, a firm may be classified as having a blackout policy for some years but not others.
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exercised upon vesting, and thus provide the CEO with no incentives to release news. In row (10)
we define a vesting month as one in which either stock and/or in-the-money options vest, and
thus exclude months in which only out-of-the-money options vest. The coefficient on ̂SaleMonth
remains significant at the 1% level. Rows (11)-(12) reclassify V estingMonth in the first stage as
months in which only options that are at least 5% and 10% out-of-the-money (respectively) are
vesting.17 ̂SaleMonth is insignificant in both specifications. Overall, the results of rows (10)-(12)
find that the incentives to strategically release news come from stock and in-the-money options,
but not out-of-the-money options. These results also help address any concern that our results are
driven by blackout periods.
In row (13), we use fiscal year and month dummies, instead of calendar year and month dummies,
to address the potential concern that the granting of stock options and restricted shares is seasonal
and a function of a firm’s fiscal year end. The coefficient on ̂SaleMonth remains significant at the
1% level.
While (calendar or month) fixed effects control for market-wide seasonalities, a remaining con-
cern is that seasonalities may be firm-specific. In row (14), we run a placebo test similar to Daines,
McQueen, and Schonlau (2018). We create a pseudo-vesting month 6 months after the actual vest-
ing month. The coefficient is insignificant, suggesting that the result is not driven by other spurious
events with a cyclical pattern.
Rows (15) and (16) verify robustness to reclassification of discretionary and non-discretionary
news. Our main specification classifies earnings calls and earnings release dates as discretionary
since there are no regulatory restrictions on these dates, and there is evidence of strategic timing for
them (e.g. Boulland and Dessaint 2017). In contrast, we classify earnings announcement dates as
non-discretionary since the SEC requires firms to report earnings within 35 (60) days after quarter
(year) end. Given our monthly unit of analysis, it is difficult to shift announcements into a different
month, at least for quarterly disclosures. In addition, prior research finds little flexibility: Bagnoli,
Kross, and Watts (2002) find that only 1.8% (1.6%) of firms are more than 7 days late (early)
17 For comparison, a 10% stock return is the 82nd percentile, i.e. a stock would have to experience an 82nd
percentile return for an option that is 10% out-of-the-money at the start of the month to become at-the-money by
the end.
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compared to their pre-announced release dates, and that being late leads to a negative market
reaction.18 Nevertheless, it is still useful to check whether our results are robust to how we classify
earnings announcements. A second motivation for this robustness check is that Edmans, Fang,
and Lewellen (2017) show that vesting equity leads to positive earnings announcements (that is
underpinned by cuts in investment growth) and we wish to check that our results are not driven
by this earlier finding. In row (15) we thus classify earnings announcements as discretionary (to be
consistent with earnings calls and earnings release dates), and in row (16) we classify all three as
non-discretionary. The coefficient on ̂SaleMonth remains significant at the 1% level.
Panel B conducts the same robustness checks using the OLS specification of Table 4, column
(1). The coefficient on V estingMonth is significant in all specifications except for the placebo
test in row (5), and rows (12) and (13) which include only months with out-of-the-money options
vesting. The coefficient on MonthBefore is significant in all specifications, and the coefficient on
MonthAfter is significant in all specifications except for row (16).
4.2 Additional analyses
This section discusses additional analyses that are reported in the Online Appendix. Table OA2
studies whether the market learns about CEOs’ tendency to time news from their past behavior,
and discounts the news releases of CEOs who have acted particularly strategically in the past.
To estimate a CEO’s past strategic behavior, we first conduct an OLS regression similar to Table
3, column (2), i.e. the second stage with news releases as the dependent variable, except that
we do not include ̂SaleMonth. This yields the “normal” number of news releases in a particular
month in the absence of strategic behavior. Then, for a particular CEO, we calculate the residuals
(actual minus predicted news items) in each vesting month over the past year, and aggregate them
over the year. This aggregate residual, Timer, measures the extent to which the CEO engaged
18 One may think that companies still have flexibility because, even if in the past they have released annual earnings
(say) 10 days after year-end, they could switch for this year to (say) 55 days after year-end if they pre-announce
that they are doing so. However, Chambers and Penman (1984) find that, even using prior earnings announcement
dates (rather than firms’ pre-announced dates), earnings announcement dates can be predicted within a few days and
annual earnings announcement dates within a week, and that being late leads to a negative stock market reaction.
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in particularly high news releases in vesting months over the past year.19 We add Timer and
DV × Timer as additional explanatory variables to the market reaction regression of Table 6,
Panel B, to test whether the market reaction to discretionary news releases depends on the extent
of past strategic behavior. The coefficient on DV × Timer is insignificant across all three event
study windows, inconsistent with learning.
Second, in Panel B, we perform the analysis separately on subsamples where the CEO’s tenure
is below or above 3 years. Learning may be stronger at the start of a CEO’s tenure; we use a 3-year
cutoff since Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2015) find that most learning occurs in the CEO’s first 3
years. Thus, if the market reacts less (more) positively to discretionary news releases by strategic
CEOs, this should particularly be the case for low-tenure CEOs. The coefficient on DV ×Timer is
insignificant for both low- and high-tenure CEOs. Overall, the results in Table OA2 suggest that
the market does not learn from past strategic behavior. This is consistent with Von Lilienfeld-Toal
and Ruenzi (2014), who find that the market does not take into account even standard measures
of CEO incentives, as discussed earlier. It is also consistent with Table 6, which documents more
positive market reactions to news releases in vesting than non-vesting months, suggesting that the
market is taking news at face value rather than considering the CEO’s incentives to release it.
Table OA3 investigates whether strategic news timing is mitigated by superior governance. We
conduct the OLS regression of Table 4, interacting both V estingMonth and V estingSensitivity
with four governance variables: analyst coverage (Analyst), institutional ownership (IO), board
independence (Insiders, the percentage of insiders on the board), and the Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003) governance index (G).20 We find that 7 out of the 8 interactions are insignificant,
suggesting that governance does not mitigate strategic news timing. This could be for two reasons.
19 We use the entire dataset to estimate the “normal” number of news items in a particular month, to obtain
precise estimates. This approach does not suffer from look-ahead bias since we do not assume that the market uses
the entire dataset to estimate the normal number of news items. Instead, we posit that the market already has in
mind a model for what determines the normal number of news items, which they use to discern whether the actual
level of disclosure by a CEO is unusual. As econometricians, we are attempting to estimate this model, and so use
the full sample.
20 We perform the interaction analysis using OLS rather than 2SLS since, with 2SLS, V estingMonth is such a
strong predictor that all the interactions are removed in the first stage.
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First, as discussed in Section 3, strategic timing is not illegal. Second, governance is endogenous: for
example, it may be that CEOs who are more likely to act strategically require greater governance.
Finally, Table OA4 verifies robustness to a weekly analysis. Under OLS, discretionary news is
significantly higher in the vesting week, both weeks before, and both weeks after. This is consistent
with the monthly results of Table 3, that discretionary news is significantly higher in the vesting
month. Note that we do not predict a negative coefficient for weeks adjacent to the vesting week,
unlike for the monthly analysis. Since the positive returns associated with discretionary news
releases are strongest in the [0,15] window, before attenuating in the [0,30] window, the positive
effect of news released in the two weeks before will still exist on the vesting date. The Poisson
results are slightly weaker, with significance in the vesting week and two weeks after, but not in
the weeks before or one week after.
Consistent with the significant negative coefficient on MonthBefore in the main specification,
discretionary news releases are significantly lower five weeks before a vesting week under both
OLS and Poisson. Consistent with the significant negative coefficient on MonthAfter in the main
specification, the likelihood of discretionary news releases is significantly lower five weeks after a
vesting week under Poisson.21
5. Conclusion
This paper shows that managers often strategically time the disclosure of discretionary corporate
news to coincide with the scheduled vesting of their equity grants. Discretionary disclosures are
significantly higher when regressing on both predicted sale months and vesting months, and lower in
the months before and after vesting. Predicted sale months and vesting months are also associated
with significantly more positive news, but not negative or neutral news. The news releases lead to
temporary increases in the stock price and trading volume, which some CEOs exploit: the median
CEO sells some vesting equity within 5 days of a discretionary news release in a vesting month.
21 Vesting dates are approximately evenly distributed between the first, 15th, and last day of the month. Thus,
on average, the vesting date will be in the middle of a month, and so the month before (after) the vesting month will
include up to six weeks before (after) the vesting week.
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Our results have two main implications. First, they suggest that CEO compensation can have
a causal effect on firm outcomes, using a measure of compensation that is likely exogenous to the
current contracting environment. Moreover, CEO incentives affect not just corporate decisions (as
typically studied by the corporate finance literature) but also the firm’s information environment.
This result links corporate finance to financial markets. Second, CEOs strategically time the release
of news. Information does not just flow mechanically to financial markets when events occur, but
instead the timing of news releases can be strategically chosen by the CEO. These news releases in
turn affect stock prices, and thus may have distributional consequences on shareholders who trade,
and efficiency consequences on stakeholders who base their decisions on corporate news or stock
prices.
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Table 2: Time from Vesting to First Sale
This table reports the distance between the month of equity vesting and the month of the first observed sale by
the CEO. The data on equity vesting is extracted from Equilar (for Russell 3000 firms for 2006-2011) and hand-
collected from SEC Form 4 and proxy statements (for S&P500 firms for 2002-2005). The data on CEO trading
is extracted from Thomson Financial Insider Trading filings (SEC Form 4) for sample firms up to 36 months af-
ter the vesting month or until the CEO leaves the firm and hence stops reporting (this data covers 2002-2014).
Stock Options
# Months Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc.
0 2,770 57.14% 4,364 32.00%
1 285 5.88% 1,000 7.33%
2 145 2.99% 674 4.94%
3 133 2.74% 561 4.11%
4 99 2.04% 440 3.23%
5 95 1.96% 396 2.90%
6 106 2.19% 404 2.96%
7 69 1.42% 327 2.40%
8 70 1.44% 267 1.96%
9 82 1.69% 365 2.68%
10 101 2.08% 376 2.76%
11 87 1.79% 356 2.61%
12 178 3.67% 545 4.00%
13 50 1.03% 203 1.49%
14 19 0.39% 144 1.06%
15 35 0.72% 156 1.14%
16 20 0.41% 120 0.88%
17 19 0.39% 101 0.74%
18 21 0.43% 118 0.87%
>18 464 9.57% 2,720 19.95%
Total 4,848 100% 13,637 100%
Table 3: News Releases and Predicted Equity Sales
This table regresses news releases on equity sale months. It instruments the endogenous regressor SaleMonth us-
ing VestingMonth which results in the instrumented variable ̂SaleMonth. Panel A reports OLS and 2SLS re-
sults. The dependent variable in the first-stage regression (column (1)) is the indicator SaleMonth, with firm-
level controls from Fos and Jiang (2016), and in the second-stage regressions (columns (2)-(3)) the main inde-
pendent variable is the instrumented SaleMonth obtained from the specification in column (1), which we de-
note as ̂SaleMonth. In columns (4)-(5), we report the results of reduced form OLS regressions in which the
main independent variable is the uninstrumented SaleMonth for comparison with the results using the instru-
mented ̂SaleMonth in columns (2)-(3). Panel B reports Poisson and Control Function results. Controls are de-
scribed in Appendix A. We control for firm, year and month fixed effects in all specifications. t-statistics are in
parentheses, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level, and ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is 2002-2011.
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares
Methodology: First Stage 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable: SaleMonth Discretionary Non-Discretionary Discretionary Non-Discretionary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VestingMonth 0.1074***
(20.58)
̂SaleMonth 0.5688*** -0.0118
(3.38) (-1.49)
SaleMonth 0.0805*** -0.0017
(3.39) (-1.49)
EAYearly 0.0502*** 1.0523*** 0.0081*** 1.0738*** 0.0077***
(8.93) (30.40) (4.48) (32.15) (4.41)
EAQuarterly 0.0017 0.9178*** 1.0036*** 0.9193*** 1.0035***
(0.54) (34.01) (512.77) (33.97) (513.07)
AGM 0.0177*** 0.7910*** 1.0334*** 0.7989*** 1.0332***
(4.15) (20.46) (334.18) (20.65) (335.29)
Board 0.0039 1.0573*** 0.9400*** 1.0580*** 0.9399***
(0.38) (11.84) (95.56) (11.93) (95.47)
EarningsSurprise 0.0053*** 0.1889*** -0.0003 0.1919*** -0.0004
(4.81) (21.83) (-0.77) (22.33) (-0.94)
Analyst -0.0002 0.0509*** 0.0000 0.0508*** 0.0000
(-0.35) (8.85) (0.12) (8.85) (0.13)
PastReturn 0.0228*** 0.0090 0.0021 0.0218* 0.0018
(9.35) (0.75) (1.55) (1.92) (1.38)
IdioVol -0.5922*** 0.3893 0.1500*** 0.0590 0.1569***
(-5.31) (0.67) (2.61) (0.10) (2.70)
Q 0.0081*** -0.0361** -0.0003 -0.0315** -0.0004
(3.08) (-2.45) (-0.42) (-2.18) (-0.56)
SalesGrowth 0.0000 0.0011 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001
(0.20) (0.61) (1.19) (0.62) (1.18)
Liquidity 0.0046 -0.0361 0.0006 -0.0335 0.0005
(1.38) (-1.25) (0.35) (-1.16) (0.32)
DivYield -0.0551* 0.2501 -0.0173* 0.2212 -0.0167*
(-1.87) (0.57) (-1.95) (0.50) (-1.88)
MarketCap 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1.31) (0.44) (-1.47) (0.39) (-1.43)
VestedSensitivity 0.0064*** -0.0023 0.0006 0.0016 0.0005
(2.90) (-0.12) (1.01) (0.08) (0.88)
UnvestedSensitivity -0.0014 0.0163 0.0001 0.0153 0.0001
(-0.62) (0.96) (0.09) (0.91) (0.12)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,903 111,882 111,882 111,882 111,882
R-squared 0.182 0.175 0.922 0.547 0.929
F-statistic 203.3
Table 3: Continued
Panel B: Poisson and Control Function Specifications
Methodology: Control Function Control Function Poisson Poisson
Dependent Variable: Discretionary Non-Discretionary Discretionary Non-Discretionary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SaleMonth 0.1727*** -0.0794 0.0319*** -0.0209
(4.67) (-0.58) (3.75) (-0.98)
EAYearly 0.3384*** 0.3768*** 0.3485*** 0.3727***
(46.07) (13.51) (30.68) (17.76)
EAQuarterly 0.2893*** 2.3418*** 0.2884*** 2.3422***
(54.96) (138.91) (31.22) (132.22)
AGM 0.2151*** 2.0588*** 0.2189*** 2.0573***
(31.80) (108.99) (20.28) (67.84)
Board 0.3303*** 1.4654*** 0.3308*** 1.4653***
(20.12) (40.09) (10.31) (18.83)
EarningsSurprise 0.0401*** 0.0057 0.0412*** 0.0052
(25.20) (1.08) (15.62) (1.27)
Analyst 0.0077*** -0.0011 0.0080*** -0.0012
(10.64) (-0.38) (5.11) (-0.54)
PastReturn 0.0030 -0.0034 0.0063 -0.0048
(0.91) (-0.31) (1.63) (-0.57)
IdioVol -0.4335** -0.1839 -0.5620** -0.1279
(-1.98) (-0.31) (-2.06) (-0.20)
Q -0.0103*** 0.0011 -0.0088* 0.0005
(-3.50) (0.11) (-1.90) (0.07)
SalesGrowth 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
(1.57) (0.66) (1.36) (1.53)
Liquidity 0.0442*** 0.0064 0.0460** 0.0057
(3.44) (0.24) (2.47) (0.36)
DivYield 0.0839 -0.0713 0.0588 -0.0605
(1.13) (-0.30) (0.32) (-0.36)
MarketCap 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(3.72) (0.24) (1.37) (0.32)
VestedSensitivity 0.0060** 0.0113 0.0061 0.0112
(2.35) (1.11) (1.29) (1.51)
UnvestedSensitivity 0.0080*** -0.0124 0.0086* -0.0127*
(3.08) (-1.24) (1.86) (-1.78)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 105,222 98,338 105,222 98,338
Table 4: Timing of News Events Around the Vesting Month
This table regresses news releases on vesting months. It reports both OLS and Poisson regressions. The dependent vari-
able NewsEvents is the number of corporate news releases. In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable includes only
discretionary news items, and in columns (2) and (4) it includes only non-discretionary news items. In Panel A, the main
independent variable V estingMonth is an indicator function that equals one in a vesting month and zero otherwise. It
also includes MonthBefore and MonthAfter to indicate the months before and after vesting, respectively. In Panel B,
the main independent variable V estingSensitivity is the sensitivity of newly-vesting equity to changes in the stock price.
Controls are described in Appendix A. We test the difference in the coefficients of V estingMonth and V estingSensitivity
between the discretionary and non-discretionary regressions and report the results below Panel A and Panel B, respec-
tively. t-statistics are in parentheses, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the firm level,
and ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is 2002-2011.
Panel A: V estingMonth Dummy as Main Independent Variable
Methodology: OLS Poisson
Dependent Variable: Discretionary Non-Discretionary Discretionary Non-Discretionary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MonthBefore -0.1381*** 0.0008 -0.0521*** -0.0502***
(-6.18) (0.68) (-6.18) (-2.72)
VestingMonth 0.0717*** -0.0014 0.0226*** -0.0186
(2.80) (-1.09) (2.63) (-0.85)
MonthAfter -0.0729*** 0.0000 -0.0280*** -0.0438**
(-3.24) (0.01) (-3.39) (-2.14)
EAYearly 1.0881*** 0.0079*** 0.3484*** 0.3908***
(31.78) (4.34) (30.09) (17.83)
EAQuarterly 0.9161*** 1.0039*** 0.2863*** 2.3519***
(33.36) (500.00) (30.94) (129.91)
AGM 0.8003*** 1.0346*** 0.2171*** 2.0733***
(20.56) (328.46) (20.16) (66.74)
Board 1.0613*** 0.9362*** 0.3370*** 1.4516***
(11.30) (92.03) (10.11) (17.90)
EarningsSurprise 0.1955*** -0.0004 0.0424*** 0.0041
(22.42) (-0.91) (16.08) (0.94)
Analyst 0.0510*** 0.0000 0.0080*** -0.0007
(8.65) (0.19) (5.14) (-0.30)
PastReturn 0.0185 0.0020 0.0058 -0.0053
(1.58) (1.43) (1.44) (-0.61)
IdioVol 0.0895 0.1678*** -0.5529** -0.1074
(0.15) (2.69) (-1.99) (-0.16)
Q -0.0327** -0.0004 -0.0088* -0.0010
(-2.23) (-0.53) (-1.88) (-0.14)
SalesGrowth 0.0011 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005
(0.64) (1.22) (1.38) (1.41)
Liquidity -0.0286 0.0002 0.0487** 0.0058
(-0.95) (0.10) (2.47) (0.38)
DivYield 0.1982 -0.0146* 0.0398 -0.0417
(0.44) (-1.65) (0.21) (-0.25)
MarketCap 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.18) (-1.41) (1.26) (0.21)
VestedSensitivity 0.0014 0.0004 0.0060 0.0116
(0.08) (0.64) (1.27) (1.52)
UnvestedSensitivity 0.0152 0.0000 0.0086* -0.0125*
(0.89) (0.05) (1.93) (-1.80)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107,784 107,784 101,550 94,919
R-squared 0.547 0.928
Test of the Difference in the Estimate of V estingMonth between Discretionary and Non-Discretionary News
F-stat (p-value) 14.59*** (0.0001) 2.80* (0.0943)
Table 4: Continued
Panel B: Sensitivity of Newly-Vested Equity as Main Independent Variable
Methodology: OLS Poisson
Dependent Variable: Discretionary Non-Discretionary Discretionary Non-Discretionary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VestingSensitivity 0.0115*** -0.0002 0.0024** -0.0012
(3.72) (-1.19) (2.51) (-0.47)
EAYearly 1.0742*** 0.0077*** 0.3454*** 0.3767***
(32.03) (4.41) (30.22) (17.78)
EAQuarterly 0.9164*** 1.0034*** 0.2881*** 2.3423***
(33.82) (510.49) (31.09) (131.96)
AGM 0.8011*** 1.0328*** 0.2190*** 2.0575***
(20.68) (333.90) (20.28) (67.42)
Board 1.0552*** 0.9398*** 0.3288*** 1.4658***
(11.84) (95.16) (10.20) (18.77)
EarningsSurprise 0.1926*** -0.0003 0.0415*** 0.0050
(22.32) (-0.89) (15.72) (1.22)
Analyst 0.0512*** 0.0000 0.0081*** -0.0011
(8.87) (0.13) (5.17) (-0.46)
PastReturn 0.0206* 0.0018 0.0070* -0.0056
(1.80) (1.33) (1.81) (-0.66)
IdioVol 0.1822 0.1508** -0.5262* -0.1304
(0.32) (2.56) (-1.93) (-0.21)
Q -0.0315** -0.0003 -0.0083* 0.0013
(-2.17) (-0.45) (-1.81) (0.19)
SalesGrowth 0.0011 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005
(0.64) (0.76) (1.42) (1.19)
Liquidity -0.0381 0.0004 0.0433** 0.0047
(-1.33) (0.25) (2.36) (0.30)
DivYield 0.2175 -0.0167* 0.0560 -0.0535
(0.46) (-1.81) (0.29) (-0.32)
MarketCap 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.38) (-1.40) (1.33) (0.33)
VestedSensitivity 0.0001 0.0005 0.0060 0.0113
(0.00) (0.84) (1.26) (1.53)
UnvestedSensitivity 0.0157 0.0000 0.0088* -0.0123*
(0.93) (0.06) (1.88) (-1.70)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 111,136 111,136 104,650 97,877
R-squared 0.547 0.929
Test of the Difference in the Estimate of V estingSensitivity between Discretionary and Non-Discretionary News
F-stat (p-value) 38.55*** (0.0000) 4.70** (0.0302)
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Table 6: Reactions to News Events in the Vesting Month
This table reports an event study of the effect of news releases on stock returns and trading volume. We denote by DV and DNV the
discretionary news released in vesting and non-vesting months, respectively, and similarly NDV and NDNV the non-discretionary news.
We use a [0,1], [0,15], and [0,30] window. The cumulative abnormal return is the raw buy-and-hold return adjusted using a beta estimated
over [-300,-46] with a market model. The average daily abnormal trading volume is in excess of its average value in the period [-70,-31], and
excludes the CEO’s own trades. Panel A reports a univariate analysis, and Panel B reports a multivariate analysis that controls for other
newsworthy events, described in Appendix A. Below Panel B, we test for the difference in the the stock price and volume reactions between
vesting and non-vesting months, after the release of discretionary (DV-DNV) and non-discretionary (NDV-NDNV) news. t-statistics are
in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is 2002-2011.
Panel A: Univariate Analysis
Abnormal Returns (basis points) Abnormal Trading Volume (percent)
[0, 1] [0, 15] [0, 30] [0, 1] [0, 15] [0, 30]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vesting Months:
Discretionary (DV) coeff 30.90*** 40.15*** 25.02*** 0.4462*** 0.0528*** 0.0062**
t-stat (12.65) (9.14) (4.15) (53.82) (15.18) (2.00)
N 61,844 61,844 61,829 61,845 61,842 61,830
Non-Discretionary (NDV) coeff 19.78** 54.16*** 56.08** 0.4555*** 0.0688*** 0.0165
t-stat (2.15) (3.20) (2.44) (22.28) (6.09) (1.58)
N 5,073 5,072 5,072 5,073 5,073 5,073
Non-Vesting Months:
Discretionary (DNV) coeff 15.53*** 29.28*** 18.82*** 0.3906*** 0.0426*** 0.0011
t-stat (12.44) (13.12) (6.11) (96.17) (24.18) (0.71)
N 245,255 245,236 245,191 245,255 245,234 245,186
Non-Discretionary (NDNV) coeff 16.91*** 63.44*** 70.13*** 0.5589*** 0.0884*** 0.0236***
t-stat (3.47) (6.72) (5.60) (44.55) (14.09) (4.10)
N 20,429 20,425 20,423 20,429 20,424 20,422
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis
Abnormal Returns (basis points) Abnormal Trading Volume (percent)
[0, 1] [0, 15] [0, 30] [0, 1] [0, 15] [0, 30]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV 30.15*** 31.21*** 14.72** 0.4167*** 0.0390*** 0.0001
(11.69) (6.71) (2.30) (50.31) (10.81) (0.03)
NDV -17.64 -16.61 30.51 -0.0231 -0.0657*** -0.0739***
(-1.02) (-0.53) (0.71) (-0.41) (-2.70) (-3.42)
DNV 14.46*** 20.17*** 8.49** 0.3606*** 0.0293*** -0.0046***
(10.39) (8.04) (2.46) (80.69) (15.06) (-2.65)
NDNV -21.83 -9.81 41.83 0.0486 -0.0494** -0.0674***
(-1.41) (-0.35) (1.09) (0.97) (-2.27) (-3.49)
EADay 42.44*** 51.92* 3.88 0.6122*** 0.1123*** 0.0811***
(2.59) (1.76) (0.10) (11.62) (4.89) (3.97)
AGMDay 23.85 8.79 -56.21 0.0677 0.0474** 0.0571***
(1.40) (0.29) (-1.33) (1.24) (1.98) (2.69)
BoardDay 60.21** 86.76* 45.25 0.1184 0.0646* 0.0514
(2.31) (1.85) (0.70) (1.42) (1.77) (1.59)
EAMonth 9.65*** 47.03*** 48.56*** 0.2092*** 0.0707*** 0.0290***
(3.27) (8.83) (6.63) (22.04) (17.07) (7.89)
AGMMonth 0.38 19.19*** 27.80*** -0.0496*** 0.0072 0.0012
(0.11) (2.95) (3.11) (-4.28) (1.42) (0.26)
BoardMonth -48.57*** -52.76*** -43.98* 0.0127 0.0662*** 0.0636***
(-5.17) (-3.12) (-1.89) (0.42) (5.03) (5.44)
Observations 332,601 332,577 332,515 332,602 332,573 332,511
Test: DV-DNV=0
F-stat 31.44*** 4.79** 0.81 39.02*** 6.12** 1.82
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.37 0.00 0.01 0.18
Test: NDV-NDNV=0
F-stat 0.18 0.15 0.22 5.23** 1.41 0.28
p-value 0.67 0.70 0.64 0.02 0.23 0.60
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Figure 1: Histogram of the Number of News Items Per Firm-Month
This figure reports the frequency of the number of discretionary and non-discretionary news items per firm-month.
The data is obtained from Capital IQ for 2002-2011.
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Figure 2: Number of Days from News Release to CEO First Sale
This figure reports the distribution of the number of trading days between a discretionary or non-discretionary news
release in a vesting month and the first observed equity sale of the CEO. News items are obtained from Capital IQ for
2002-2011. We consider only news that is released within 30 days of the most recent vesting date. The data on CEO
trading is extracted from Thomson Financial Insider Trading filings (SEC Form 4) for sample firms up to 36 months
after the vesting month or until the CEO leaves the firm and hence stops reporting (this data covers 2002-2014).
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable DefinitionsVariable Definition
AGM is an indicator function that equals one if a particular
month coincides with the firm’s annual general meeting,
and zero otherwise.
AGMDay is an indicator function that equals one if a particular day
coincides with the firm’s annual general meeting, and zero
otherwise.
Analyst is the log of one plus the number of analysts following a
particular stock. The number of analysts is obtained from
the I/B/E/S files.
Board is an indicator that equals one if a particular month coin-
cides with a board meeting, and zero otherwise.
BoardDay is an indicator that equals one if a particular day coincides
with a board meeting, and zero otherwise.
DivYield is the dividend yield measured at the end of the prior fis-
cal year, as is calculated as (common dividend (DVC) plus
preferred dividend (DVP)) divided by (market value of eq-
uity plus book value of preferred stock), where book value
of preferred stock is defined as the first non-missing value
of its redemption value (PSTKRV), or its liquidating value
(PSTKL), or its carrying value (PSTK).
EADay is an indicator function that equals one if a particular day
coincides with the firm’s earnings announcement, and zero
otherwise.
EAQuarterly is an indicator function that equals one if a particular
month coincides with the firm’s announcement of quarterly
earnings, and zero otherwise.
EAYearly is an indicator function that equals one if a particular
month coincides with the firm’s announcement of annual
earnings, and zero otherwise.
EarningsSurprise is the earnings surprise measure from the I/B/E/S
database, and zero if there is no earnings announcement
that month.
GrantMonth is an indicator variable that equals one if there is an equity
grant award in that month, and zero otherwise.
IdioVol is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market
model on daily returns from the past one year.
Liquidity is the logarithm of one plus the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
ratio multiplied by negative one, where the ratio is calcu-
lated as the daily price response associated with one dollar
of trading volume, averaged over the prior fiscal year.
MarketCap is the logarithm of the market value of equity (CSHO ×
PRCC F) measured at the end of the prior fiscal year.
MonthAfter is an indicator variable that equals one if a given month is
immediately after a vesting month, and zero otherwise.
MonthBefore is an indicator variable that equals one if a given month is
immediately prior to a vesting month, and zero otherwise.
NewsEvents is the count of the number of news items released in a given
month.
PastReturn is the past 12-month return of each firm.
Variable DefinitionsPseudoVestingMonth is an indicator for a pseudo-vesting month that is exactly
6 months after the actual vesting month.
Q is the ratio of market to book value of equity of a given
firm at the end of the prior fiscal year.
SaleMonth is an indicator variable that equals one if there is a CEO
equity sale in a given month, and zero otherwise.
SalesGrowth is the sales growth rate measured at the end of the prior
fiscal year, and is calculated as sales minus lagged sales
divided by lagged sales.
UnvestedSensitivity is the log of the dollar sensitivity of the CEO’s unvested
equity to a 100% change in the stock price.
VestedSensitivity is the log of the dollar sensitivity of the CEO’s already-
vested equity to a 100% change in the stock price.
VestingMonth is the calendar month in which stock and option grants are
pre-scheduled to vest according to the Equilar database
and manual identification.
VestingSensitivity is the log of the dollar sensitivity of the CEO’s newly-
vesting equity to a 100% change in the stock price.
Appendix B: Distribution of Corporate News Events
Panel A: Discretionary News Items
Proportion of All Items
Vesting Months Non-Vesting Months
Company Conference Presentations 14.07% 14.27%
Conferences 11.65% 11.68%
Earnings Calls 8.57% 8.35%
Earnings Release Date 8.03% 7.83%
Product-Related Announcements 7.33% 7.43%
Client Announcements 6.78% 6.91%
Executive/Board Changes - Other 5.10% 5.04%
Corporate Guidance - New/Confirmed 4.14% 3.96%
Buyback Update 3.57% 3.73%
Dividend Affirmations 3.11% 2.95%
M&A Transaction Closings 2.59% 2.67%
M&A Transaction Announcements 1.52% 1.58%
Shelf Registration Filings 1.47% 1.43%
Business Expansions 1.36% 1.42%
Debt Financing Related 1.22% 1.26%
Fixed Income Offerings 1.20% 1.27%
Buybacks 1.08% 1.05%
Changes in Company Bylaws/Rules 0.99% 0.95%
Strategic Alliances 0.99% 1.01%
Impairments/Write Offs 0.79% 0.74%
Lawsuits & Legal Issues 0.78% 0.80%
Dividend Increases 0.77% 0.69%
Shareholder/Analyst Calls 0.59% 0.61%
Private Placements 0.59% 0.60%
Executive Changes - CFO 0.44% 0.44%
Follow-on Equity Offerings 0.43% 0.43%
Preferred Dividend 0.40% 0.39%
Dividend 0.39% 0.38%
Special Calls 0.35% 0.36%
Seeking Acquisitions/Investments 0.32% 0.31%
Executive Changes - CEO 0.30% 0.29%
Analyst/Investor Day 0.25% 0.24%
Sales/Trading Statement Calls 0.20% 0.21%
M&A Calls 0.20% 0.21%
Subtotal 91.54% 91.49%
(Continues on the next page)
Appendix B: Continued
Panel A: Discretionary News Items (Cont.)
Proportion of All Items
Vesting Months Non-Vesting Months
Guidance/Update Calls 0.11% 0.12%
Corporate Guidance - Raised 0.11% 0.12%
M&A Transaction Cancellations 0.11% 0.10%
Delayed SEC Filings 0.11% 0.11%
Business Reorganizations 0.10% 0.10%
Corporate Guidance - Lowered 0.10% 0.11%
Labor-related Announcements 0.07% 0.06%
Special Dividend Announced 0.06% 0.07%
Dividend Decreases 0.04% 0.04%
Restatements of Operating Results 0.03% 0.03%
Seeking to Sell/Divest 0.03% 0.03%
Delayed Earnings Announcements 0.03% 0.03%
Address Changes 0.02% 0.02%
Spin-Off/Split-Off 0.02% 0.02%
Seeking Financing/Partners 0.02% 0.02%
Composite Units Offerings 0.01% 0.01%
Potential Buyback 0.01% 0.01%
M&A Rumors and Discussions 0.01% 0.01%
Fiscal Year End Changes 0.01% 0.01%
Dividend Initiation 0.01% 0.01%
Name Changes 0.01% 0.01%
Dividend Cancellation 0.01% 0.01%
IPOs 0.01% 0.01%
Ticker Changes 0.01% 0.01%
Exchange Changes 0.01% 0.01%
Debt Defaults 0.00% 0.00%
Legal Structure Changes 0.00% 0.00%
Subtotal 1.05% 1.07%
Total Discretionary 92.59% 92.56%
Panel B: Non-Discretionary News Items
Proportion of All Items
Vesting Months Non-Vesting Months
Announcements of Earnings 4.29% 4.36%
Annual General Meeting 2.29% 2.26%
Board Meeting 0.31% 0.28%
Auditor Changes 0.22% 0.23%
End of Lock-Up Period 0.19% 0.20%
Delistings 0.09% 0.09%
Regulatory Agency Inquiries 0.02% 0.02%
Total Non-Discretionary 7.41% 7.44%
Overall Total 100.00% 100.00%
Appendix C: Examples of Capital IQ Items for Wal-Mart in Q1 2012
GVKEY Year Month Day Event Type Title Source
11259 2012 1 2 M&A Transac-
tion Closings
Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP sold its stake in Wal-
Mart Stores Inc. (NYSE: WMT).
Capital IQ Trans-
action Database
11259 2012 1 4 Lawsuits & Legal
Issues
Keller Rohrback L.L.P. Announces Preliminary Ap-
proval of Class Action Settlement against Wal-Mart
Stores Inc., BofA Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Incorporated, Merrill Lynch Trust Company of
America, and Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc
Business Wire
11259 2012 1 16 Executive/Board
Changes - Other
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Announces Executive Changes PR Newswire
11259 2012 1 19 Lawsuits & Legal
Issues
Wal-Mart Women Plaintiffs File Expanded Texas
Class Action against Wal-Mart Stores Inc
PR Newswire
11259 2012 1 22 Conferences Retail Industry Leaders Association, RILA’s Leader-
ship Forum 2012, Jan 22, 2012 through Jan 24, 2012
Company Website
11259 2012 1 23 Company Con-
ference Presenta-
tions
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Presents at RILA’s Leadership
Forum 2012, Jan-23-2012 02:30 PM
Company Website
11259 2012 2 6 Lawsuits & Legal
Issues
MacroSolve, Inc. Files Patent Infringement Suit
Against Wal-Mart Stores Inc
Market Wire
11259 2012 2 9 Client Announce-
ments
MMA Elite Supplements Powered by Muscle Pharm
Corp. Available at Wal-Mart Stores
PR Newswire
11259 2012 2 18 Private Place-
ments
Yishiduo E-Commerce announced that it expects to
receive funding from Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Capital IQ Trans-
action Database
11259 2012 2 20 Earnings Calls Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Q4 2012 Pre Recorded Earnings
Call
Business Wire;
Company Website
11259 2012 2 21 Announcements
of Earnings
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Announces Unaudited Consol-
idated Earnings Results for the Fourth Quarter and
Full Year Ended January 31, 2012; Provides Earnings
Guidance for the First Quarter and Full Year of 2013
Business Wire
11259 2012 2 21 Buyback Tranche
Update
Update to Wal-Mart Stores Inc.’s Equity Buyback
Plan
Capital IQ Buy-
backs Database
11259 2012 2 21 Corporate
Guidance -
New/Confirmed
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Announces Unaudited Consol-
idated Earnings Results for the Fourth Quarter and
Full Year Ended January 31, 2012; Provides Earnings
Guidance for the First Quarter and Full Year of 2013
Business Wire
11259 2012 2 21 Earnings Release
Date
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. to Report Q4, 2012 Results on
Feb 21, 2012
Company Website
11259 2012 2 28 Private Place-
ments
Yishiduo E-Commerce announced that it has received
funding from Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Capital IQ Trans-
action Database
11259 2012 3 1 Dividend In-
creases
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Increases Annual Dividend for
the Fiscal Year Ending Jan. 31, 2013
Business Wire
11259 2012 3 4 Conferences Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Raymond James
& Associates’s 33rd Annual Institutional Investors
Conference, Mar 04, 2012 through Mar 07, 2012
PR Newswire;
Business Wire;
GlobeNewswire;
Company Web-
site; Market Wire;
Regulatory News
Service; SEDAR
11259 2012 3 6 Conferences Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Bank of America Merrill
Lynch 2012 Consumer & Retail Conference, Mar 06,
2012 through Mar 08, 2012
PR Newswire;
Business Wire;
GlobeNewswire;
Company Website
11259 2012 3 7 Company Con-
ference Presenta-
tions
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Presents at Bank of America
Merrill Lynch 2012 Consumer & Retail Conference,
Mar-07-2012 08:00 AM
PR Newswire;
Business Wire;
GlobeNewswire;
Company Website
11259 2012 3 7 Company Con-
ference Presenta-
tions
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Presents at Raymond James &
Associates’s 33rd Annual Institutional Investors Con-
ference, Mar-07-2012 11:35 AM
PR Newswire;
Business Wire;
GlobeNewswire;
Company Web-
site; Market Wire;
Regulatory News
Service; SEDAR
11259 2012 3 28 Company Con-
ference Presenta-
tions
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Presents at CIBC Retail and
Consumer Conference, Mar-28-2012 11:30 AM
Business Wire;
GlobeNewswire;
Canada News
Wire; Company
Website; Market
Wire
Appendix D: Distribution of Events in the Calendar Year
Calendar Month VestingMonth EAYearly EAQuarterly AGM Board GrantMonth Discret. Non-Discret.
1 12% 19% 6% 2% 9% 14% 7% 5%
2 17% 44% 10% 2% 12% 23% 8% 8%
3 12% 15% 5% 2% 8% 14% 8% 5%
4 6% 1% 9% 13% 6% 6% 8% 10%
5 9% 3% 15% 50% 12% 7% 9% 22%
6 6% 2% 2% 16% 5% 5% 8% 7%
7 6% 2% 11% 2% 8% 5% 8% 9%
8 6% 4% 14% 3% 9% 5% 9% 10%
9 5% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 8% 2%
10 5% 2% 12% 2% 11% 4% 9% 9%
11 6% 4% 13% 3% 10% 6% 9% 10%
12 9% 2% 2% 2% 7% 9% 8% 3%
